by Alex KornfeldRental Car Criminal Defense Rights
Violating a Rental Car Agreement Doesn’t Give Police A Right To Violate One’s Constitutional Rights
In September of 2014 a lady rented a car in New Jersey while Terrence Byrd waited outside. The signed rental car agreement warned that permitting an unauthorized driver to drive the car would violate the agreement. The lady gave the keys to Byrd once she left the Budget car-rental facility. Byrd stored personal belongings in the trunk and left alone for Pittsburgh. Byrd was stopped for a traffic infraction. Get this; according to the Supreme Court Order the Penn State Trooper that pulled Byrd over was “suspicious of Byrd because he was driving with his hands at the “10 and 2” position on the steering wheel, sitting far back from the steering wheel, and driving a rental car.” Put another way, he said that Byrd looked suspicious without articulating that Byrd violated any laws. Penn State Troopers learned that Byrd was not listed as an authorized driver AND that he had prior drug and weapons convictions. Byrd told the Troopers he had a blunt in the car and offered to get it for the Troopers which the Troopers agreed to. The Troopers told Byrd they didn’t need his consent to search the car and the trunk. The Troopers searched the trunk and discovered body armor and 49 bricks of heroin in the trunk. The case was turned over to the Feds and they charged him with distribution and possession of heroin with intent to distribute and possession of body armor by a prohibited person.
Byrd’s motion to suppress the evidence under the theory of fruit of the poisonous tree was denied. The Court reasoned that because Byrd was NOT listed on the rental agreement, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. On May 14, 2018 the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and found that Byrd did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Court specifically held, “The mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.” This is good sound reasoning. Otherwise, one could effectively contract another’s (in this case, Byrd’s) constitutional rights away by violating the terms of an agreement. Put another way, just because a civil contract is violated doesn’t mean you have sacrificed or waived your constitutional rights!
The Court took a practical approach and added, “As anyone who has rented a car knows, car-rental agreements are filled with long lists of restriction.” Put another way, we know you don’t read the 28 page contract.
The Supreme Court sent the case back to the lower court to consider whether Byrd had an expectation of privacy even though he used the lady to get the car because he could not rent the car himself OR whether the Troopers had probable cause to search the car because they believed it contained evidence of a crime.
“Few protections are as essential to individual liberty as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”.
by Alex KornfeldCONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF DRUGS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER
Constructive Possession is defined as having dominion and control over something such as drugs or contraband. To prove possession under the theory of constructive possession the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “one had it and knew they had it.” See Quotes of Jake Erwin, Esq.
Constructive possession requires evidence that the defendant had dominion and control over either the drugs or the premises upon which the drugs are found. See State v. Heath, 370 S.C. 326, 635 S.E.2d 18 (2006).
Constructive possession is the adversary to mere presence. The difference between constructive possession and mere presence is the difference between being guilty or not guilty. Mere presence is not enough to find one guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but one can infer proof of possession as well as knowledge or intend for that presence. State v. Bultron, 318 S.C. 323, 457 S.E.2d, 616 (Ct. App. 1995)
In short, whether one is in constructive possession or not is highly fact specific and if charged with possession under a theory of constructive possession one would be wise to discuss all the relevant facts with their lawyer.
Alex Kornfeld is a criminal defense lawyer in Greenville, South Carolina. You can scheduled a consultation with him by calling 864-335-9990.
by Alex KornfeldBURGLARY. APPURTENANT OR NOT IS THE KEY QUESTION
BURGLARY. APPURTENANT OR NOT IS THE KEY QUESTION IN STATE V. JOHN KENNETH MASSEY, JR.
John Kenneth Massey, Jr. was charged with first degree burglary. Prior to trial Massey’s lawyer moved to quash the first-degree burglary indictment because the building that Massey allegedly burglarized was on a separate piece of land than the victim’s residence and it was used for the victim’s business, not as a dwelling.
The land of which the business was located was titled in his Uncle Bill’s name, not his name. The victim also stated the building that was burglarized was primarily used as a storage building for belongings like four-wheelers, boats, and tools.
The Government argued the storage building was appurtenant to the family dwelling. Although the building was titled in Uncle Bill’s name it was a mere 200 feet from victim’s residence. Over the government’s objection, the Court granted Massey’s motion to quash the indictment reasoning that victim did not own the piece of land (remember Uncle Bill did) or the storage building nor was it appurtenant to the residence. The Court further stated the appropriate charge is actually burglary, second degree.
The government attempted to argue for the first time before the South Carolina Court of Appeals that the lower court lacked authority to quash the indictment because burglary is a crime of possession, not a crime of ownership. The South Carolina Court of Appeals did not rule on this argument because it was unpreserved.
In layman terms, the Court found the storage building wasn’t a dwelling which was a requirement to meet the elements of first-degree burglary in this case. To be first degree burglary in this case the structure needed to be within 200 yards of a dwelling AND appurtenant. The government couldn’t prove the latter because the Court found that a building unattached to a residence on a separate parcel of land isn’t appurtenant.
So, what difference does it make if it’s burglary first or burglary second? A whole lotta time…A whole lotta time.
Source: https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/COA/5630.pdf
On June 10, 2020 The South Carolina Supreme Court Reversed the Court of Appeals Decision and Remanded the Case to the trial court.
Source: https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/27981.pdf
I HAVE INCLUDED THE BURGLARY LAWS FOR REFERENCE
SECTION 16-11-311. Burglary; first degree.
(A) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and either:
(1) when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) is armed with a deadly weapon or explosive; or
(b) causes physical injury to a person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or
(d) displays what is or appears to be a knife, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other firearm; or
(2) the burglary is committed by a person with a prior record of two or more convictions for burglary or housebreaking or a combination of both; or
(3) the entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime.
(B) Burglary in the first degree is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, “life” means until death. The court, in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to a term of not less than fifteen years.
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 159, Section 2; 1995 Act No. 83, Section 17.
SECTION 16-11-311. Burglary; first degree.
(A) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime in the dwelling, and either:
(1) when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) is armed with a deadly weapon or explosive; or
(b) causes physical injury to a person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or
(d) displays what is or appears to be a knife, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other firearm; or
(2) the burglary is committed by a person with a prior record of two or more convictions for burglary or housebreaking or a combination of both; or
(3) the entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime.
(B) Burglary in the first degree is a felony punishable by life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, “life” means until death. The court, in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to a term of not less than fifteen years.
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 159, Section 2; 1995 Act No. 83, Section 17.
SECTION 16-11-312. Burglary; second degree.
(A) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if the person enters a dwelling without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein.
(B) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if the person enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein, and either:
(1) When, in effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon or explosive; or
(b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument; or
(d) Displays what is or appears to be a knife, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other firearm; or
(2) The burglary is committed by a person with a prior record of two or more convictions for burglary or housebreaking or a combination of both; or
(3) The entering or remaining occurs in the nighttime.
(C)(1) Burglary in the second degree pursuant to subsection (A) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten years.
(2) Burglary in the second degree pursuant to subsection (B) is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, provided, that no person convicted of burglary in the second degree pursuant to subsection (B) shall be eligible for parole except upon service of not less than one-third of the term of the sentence.
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 159, Section 2; 2010 Act No. 273, Section 11, eff June 2, 2010.
SECTION 16-11-313. Burglary; third degree.
(A) A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree if the person enters a building without consent and with intent to commit a crime therein.
(B) Burglary in the third degree is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years for conviction on a first offense and for not more than ten years for conviction of a second offense according to the discretion of the Court.
HISTORY: 1985 Act No. 159, Section 2.
by Alex KornfeldCivil Forfeiture In South Carolina And How To Get Your Money Back
If you’ve been charged with a crime in South Carolina and money or property was seized in relation to the charge your property was likely taken pursuant to a civil forfeiture. I am sure you are concerned with getting your money or property back. This article will briefly explain that process.
Recently, the press has given more attention to civil forfeitures. John Oliver even did an entire special concerning civil forfeitures.
Some of the items that law enforcement may seize covers a wide variety of property to include money in close proximity to the alleged crime, firearms, equipment and materials used in the production of illegal substances, land, vehicles, overseas assets of persons convicted of trafficking in persons also are subject to forfeiture to the extent they can be retrieved by the government, tools, and written or electronic records.
After law enforcement seizes the property they are required by law to file a civil forfeiture suit within a reasonable amount of time. This suit must be properly served on the Defendant. At that time the Defendant may respond. Law enforcement will attempt to keep the property. The Defendant will attempt to get the property back.
Defendant’s may bring several defenses. It is best to consult with a lawyer prior to responding to the lawsuit.
Alex Kornfeld is a lawyer in Greenville, South Carolina. If you have been served with a civil forfeiture lawsuit and you are trying to get your money or property back it is in your best interest to consult with an lawyer. You may reach Alex by phone at 864-335-9990.
Sources:
by Alex KornfeldJOHNSON CUT WHITE’S HAIR. SOMETIME LATER, WHITE CUT JOHNSON’S THROAT. Self-defense, accident, shanks, and haircuts
A review of State v. David Alan White. Self-defense, accident, shanks, and haircuts
On the night of November 27, 2013 in Charleston County, “Johnson cut White’s hair. Sometime later, White cut Johnson’s throat.” David Alan White and Joseph Johnson were at a friend’s backyard gathering. It was unclear as to what caused White to cut Johnson’s throat.
White testified at trial that he did not mean to injure Johnson. White testified that Johnson was cutting his hair. Sometime later, White decided to leave the backyard gathering. As he was walking he was punched on the side of his head. White testified he had one hand in his pocket and quickly spun around after he was punched. White testified he then noticed that Johnson was injured. While spinning around White swung a knife that stabbed Johnson.
White testified that he didn’t feel threatened but had a lot of head injured in the past. One in which he was hit on the side of his head that required stitches, one in which he was hit by a window pane that required stitches, and he once had a brain aneurysm. White further testified that he didn’t run because he was scared and didn’t know if he could get away safely. White then testified that he did feel threatened by the conversation with Johnson and his intent in swinging his arm was to protect himself. White stated his swinging was a reaction and that he didn’t even realize the knife was in his hand or that it was Johnson that close behind him when he swung his arm. White later testified that he knew it was Johnson who hit him but that he was fearful of Johnson.
White requested the Court charge the jury on self-defense and accident, first-degree assault and battery, and second-degree assault and battery. The trial court refused to charge self-defense and second-degree assault and battery. White was found guilty of ABHAN (assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature) and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime and sentenced him to 15 years in prison.
During the trial, White wanted to testify about Mr. Johnson’s statements concerning weapons on his moped and about shanks that Mr. Johnson made in the past arguing it was relevant to self-defense and was not hearsay but the Court excluded this testimony. The South Carolina Court of Appeals found White should have been able to testify concerning the weapons on Johnson’s moped as it was relevant to his self-defense claim. The Court refused to make any ruling concerning the admissibility of the shanks due to the fact that this evidence was admitted to impeach Johnson at trial.
The Court reasoned that Johnson’s statements were relevant to explain why White believed he was “in imminent danger and if that belief was reasonable”. Although White admitted he did not know if Johnson was armed or saw Johnson with a weapon, Johnson testified he accessed his moped directly before he incident. The Court found, “Because White had reason to believe Johnson stored weapons on his moped and accessed his moped prior to the stabbing, we find Johnson’s statement was relevant to White’s self-defense claim.”
The Court also ruled that Johnson’s statements about weapons on his moped were not hearsay because the statements were offered to show what Johnson believed, not for the truth of the matter asserted.
White also argued that the trial court erred by limiting him to pursue either a self-defense OR an accident defense because there was evidence in the record to support both theories. The South Carolina Court of appeals agreed with White and reasoned, “Here, there was evidence White unintentionally stabbed Johnson and also evidence he intentionally stabbed Johnson.”
In 2013, November 27th was the day before Thanksgiving. You can almost paint of picture of the gathering in the backyard. Johnson cutting White’s hair. Talking about mopeds, weapons, and Johnson’s ability to make shanks. What else were White and Johnson conversating about??? We may never know, but I can tell you one thing; You betta tip your barber!
Alex Kornfeld is a Criminal Defense Attorney in Greenville, South Carolina. If you have been arrested or are under suspicion of a crime, it is in your best interest to consult with an attorney. You may reach Alex by phone at 864-335-9990.
by Alex KornfeldGwen Stefani says, “Don’t Speak.” SC Court of Appeals Says State Can Argue “What You’re Thinking”
South Carolina Court of Appeals Holds Your Silence CAN Be Used Against You
We’ve all heard it in TV shows and movies, “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say, can, and will be used against you …” If it’s Chris Rock in Lethal Weapon 4 you’ll also hear, “You have the right to an attorney. If you can’t afford an attorney, we’ll provide you with the dumbest f***ing lawyer on earth. If you get Johnny Cochrane, I’ll kill ya!” Well, as far as the first part goes, the SC Court of Appeals has ruled that anything you don’t say may ALSO be used against you.
Specifically, the SCCOA held, “In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, the state does not violate a defendant’s due process rights by permitting cross-examination of his post-arrest silence when a defendant takes the stand.”
“Due process is not violated because such silence is probative and does not rest on any implied assurance by law enforcement authorities that it will carry no penalty.”
To make matters worse, the CoA has adopted the state of Georgia’s ruling that it is the Defendant’s burden to show whether the defendant has been administered his Miranda rights—to put it in legalese is to say the Defendant has the burden to show whether a Doyle violation has occurred. What’s a “Doyle Violation?” I’m glad you asked.
On May 25, 2017, Mr. Tappia Dangelo Green was convicted of Armed Robbery, Kidnapping, and Possession of a Weapon During a Violent Crime. Green appealed his conviction arguing the Trial Court should not have (1) allowed a detective’s irrelevant testimony concerning the victim’s fear, (2) allowed evidence of Green’s post-arrest silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, and (3) granted a mistrial when a juror was unable to participate in deliberation.
At trial, the State stated Green and two others held a victim under gunpoint and took a small amount of cash and jewelry and then drove him to his employment to collect his paycheck and then drove him to ACE Cash Express in North Charleston. Green and his comrades released him after taking his money. Green’s defense was that the victim owed him money for drugs and that the victim voluntarily rode with the men to cash his check and turn over the money. Green’s defense was that the victim falsely alleged this was a crime to avoid the wrath of his girlfriend.
- ALLOWED A DETECTIVE’S IRRELEVANT TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE VICTIM’S FEAR
The COA found that Detective Butler’s testimony that the victim appeared creditable because he was more fearful than the average victim was NOT preserved for review because Green only objected on the grounds of relevance. Had Green objected on grounds of irrelevant bolstering it appears the COA would have found the objection should have at least been sustained. However, the CoA opined that whether the victim’s story was believable was relevant because the defense argued the victim was not telling the truth because he was afraid his girlfriend would find out about his drug debts.
- ALLOWED EVIDENCE OF GREEN’S POST-ARREST SILENCE IN VIOLATION OF DOYLE V. OHIO
Next, and the most interesting holding is this case, was whether the state violated the Defendant’s due process rights by permitting cross-examination of his post-arrest silence when a defendant took the stand. The CoA held, In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, “the state does not violate a defendant’s due process rights by permitting cross-examination of his post-arrest silence when a defendant takes the stand.” In laymen terms that means your silence CAN be held against you IF you are not Mirandized and you take the stand.
To make matters worse, there was a disagreement as to whether the Defendant was Mirandized. The Defendant stated he was and, “That’s why they do police body cameras. All that should be on record.” The officer who testified denied giving the Defendant Miranda warnings. Defendant’s lawyer moved for a mistrial noting the police incident report noted the entire incident was captured with body cameras. Defense counsel properly asserted it was the State’s burden to prove the matter beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court disagreed opining that it was merely a question of whether a Doyle violation occurred- meaning whether Defendant was Mirandized and therefore his silence couldn’t be used against him should he testify.
- NOT GRANTING A MISTRIAL WHEN A JUROR WAS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN DELIBERATION.
During the trial, Juror #280 was unable to participate in deliberations due to a menstrual problem. The trial court judge said, “I’m going to miss try [sic] the case” noting that Juror #280 wasn’t participating and therefore, was not an effective juror. However, the jury returned a verdict before the Judge could declare a mistrial. The Defendant did not object or move for a mistrial until AFTER the jury found him guilty. You can’t get the verdict and then decide to appeal on grounds that the juror was ineffective just because you don’t like the verdict.
In closing, it’s important to emphatically (and at the top of your lungs) DEMAND a lawyer.
Comedian Tom Segura said it best during his ‘First 48’ bit in his 2014 Netflix Stand-Up Comedy Special, Completely Normal, “Lawyer up. [Don’t be like,] ‘I’m gonna talk to the cops and straighten this whole thing out.’ You’re gonna do 25-Life; have fun with that man.”
Say, “I want a lawyer.”
Say, “I’d love to tell you everything, but my lawyer requires that he be present.”
Sadly, it appears that not only the things you say can be used against you but even when you …DON’T SPEAK… the State can try and use that against you as well.
LINKS
https://abcnews4.com/news/crime-news/man-charged-in-robbery-of-good-samaritan-sentenced-to-15-years
by Alex KornfeldALEX KORNFELD IS 2018 LEGAL ELITE ACCORDING TO GREENVILLE BUSINESS MAGAZINE
Greenville Business Magazine has named Alex Kornfeld as a legal elite. The publication states the honor is given and that only attorneys in the region are allowed to vote. They then honor the top vote getters.
It’s an honor to even be considered but I can’t help but to think of Jerry Seinfeld’s take on awards. I feel as though it is silly but I am still honored so thank you. Jerry Seinfeld’s Take On Awards
by Alex KornfeldThe 4th Amendment, Flashy Cars, And ‘Responsible Party’ Undefined
The 4th Amendment; Vehicle Impound Searches And Why Justice Beatty’s Dissent Is Right. A cursory review of State v. Jonathan Xavier Miller.
In 2013, two Columbia Cops were investigating unrelated criminal activity when a local resident informed the cops that an older-model, silver and green Chevy with large rims was making a lot of stops “at a location known for drug activity.”
Why wouldn’t he take advice from Lil Dicky and Save That $ (I know this link is forced but so is this opinion.)
For whatever reason, Jonathan Xavier Miller, didn’t save that money. He got the big rims instead and he was approached by cops later that day when he pulled into a gas station parking lot. When Miller got out of the car he didn’t have a driver’s license with him but gave his name and DOB. DMV records showed that Miller’s license was expired SOOOOO the cops arrested Miller. The cops then searched him incident to his arrest and found an electronic scale in his pocket. The cops learned the vehicle owner was a Cassandra Jones. They then asked for consent to search, but Miller must be a fan of Jay-Z because he refused to allow the Cops to search his stuff. (Should I just write what Jay-Z really says?) While Miller was being arrested his girl came out of an apartment and told the cops that Miller was visiting her.
Columbia Police Department’s standard procedure permit its officers to tow vehicles when the driver is arrested away from his residence and there is no responsible party present at the scene. The policy requires cops to conduct an inventory search of the passenger compartment of a towed vehicle. Because Miller was arrested and the owner of the vehicle was not present, the cop called a tow truck to tow the car. Before the truck arrived, the cops did an inventory search and found about 5 grams of crack cocaine under the driver’s seat.
The issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court is whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the cops to seize, search, and then tow the Chevy Miller drove while on private property away from his residence when the owner of the vehicle is not present.
The first thing the Court determined was whether the cop’s decision to seize Miller’s Chevy violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that since the cops acted in accordance with the department policy that was passed under authority of a state statute that Miller’s 4th amendment rights were not violated. Of importance was the 3 requirements of the policy that must be met before the vehicle is towed: (1) the officer makes the arrest from the vehicle, (2) the arrest occurs away from the arrestee’s residence, and (3) the owner is not present at the scene and no other person is present who is authorized to take responsibility for the vehicle.
The Court then addressed whether it was reasonable to do an inventory search of the vehicle. The Courts have long held that if it is reasonable to seize a vehicle it is reasonable to do an inventory search so long as it is conducted according to standardized criteria AND performed in good faith. Here, the search was conducted according to the written policy and Miller did not allege bad faith.
The real issue that the Court fails to address is what does it take to be authorized to take responsibility for the vehicle???? No one has alleged that Miller’s girlfriend is not authorized to take responsibility for the vehicle and it is not alleged that he was in unlawful possession of the vehicle. This leaves one to conjecture: Would Miller have escaped a search incident to arrest if he had a letter from the owner in the vehicle giving him permission to be in possession of the vehicle? Would a recording of the owner authorizing him to be in the vehicle be suffice? What about a text? My argument is that the Courts have agreed that that no one was present who was authorized to take responsibility for the vehicle without first requiring the State to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt-WHICH THEY MUST and they failed to do.
Thankfully this was not lost on Justice Beatty. I urge you to read his dissent attached below but I have attached some of my favorite points.
“I respectfully dissent as I believe the circumstances did not reasonably justify the seizure, which precipitated the inventory search. Initially, other than a citizen’s “tip” about a vehicle making frequent stops in a location known for drug activity, the officers offered no objective justification for pursuing Miller’s vehicle, asking for his information, and consent to search the vehicle. Further, because the Columbia Police Department’s policy did not provide the requisite authority to seize Miller’s vehicle from the private driveway, the ultimate seizure was unlawful and, in turn, the resultant inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment.”
“Given this evidence, I would find the officers’ decision to tow Miller’s vehicle from a private driveway was improper as it was based solely on a suspicion of drug activity. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (recognizing that “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence”); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375 (“Nothing in Opperman or [Illinois v.] Layfayette, [462 U.S. 640 (1983)] prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” (emphasis added)); cf. S. Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (upholding inventory search where “there [was] no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure . . . was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive”).”
“I believe the mere existence of a police department policy is insufficient to satisfy the State’s burden of proving the applicability of the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Spencer, 948 N.E.2d at 203 (“[T]he existence of a police regulation cannot be used as a predicate to determine the lawfulness or reasonableness of an inventory search of a vehicle.”). “To hold otherwise would grant the police an unlimited ability to evade the requirements of the fourth amendment by promulgating regulations that authorize the use of inventory searches following every arrest.” Id. Unlike the majority, I do not believe the Columbia Police Department’s policy authorized the officers to seize Miller’s vehicle from a private driveway.”
And probably MOST persuasive:
“Finally, even accepting the majority’s conclusion that the Columbia Police Department’s policy authorized the officers to tow Miller’s vehicle from private property, I would find the officers failed to comply with the procedure outlined in Section 7.2. In relevant part, Section 7.2 states: “Department personnel may also tow the following vehicles: Any vehicle from which an officer makes an arrest and there is no responsible party to whom the arrestee can turn over the possession of the vehicle (§56-5-2520 S.C. Code).” (Emphasis added.) Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, this provision does not require the responsible party be “present” at the location of the vehicle about to be towed. Here, Officer McDonald admitted that he did not check to determine if there was a responsible party despite the requirement in the policy.”
State v. Jonathan Xavier Miller https://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/27798.pdf
by Alex KornfeldWhat Happens in Marion County, Stays in Marion County
A great criminal defense lawyer knows the ins and outs of the legal system, and may be able to spot certain arguments and factors that could mitigate or even negate a potential crime.